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I am grateful for the chance to be with you today at this interesting and timely 
conference . I would like to thank Janet Yellen and the Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco for inviting me to speak to you on Asia and the global finan-
cial crisis .
We remain in the midst of an exceptionally difficult and challenging period . 
The past year’s dramatic bout of financial turmoil, accompanied by large-scale 
wealth destruction, stunning declines in industrial production and in global 
trade and worrisome increases in unemployment have been met by an unprec-
edented policy response . Both the scale of the anticrisis measures and the level 
of international collaboration have been unique . It is therefore gratifying that 
consensus views evident at the IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings that 
just concluded in Istanbul are that the worst has past, and the healing process 
has begun . As difficult as the past year has been, there is a palpable sense that 
forceful policy actions succeeded in staving off even more negative outcomes .
Although our base case expectations—as detailed in the latest World Eco-
nomic Outlook—anticipate renewed global expansion, it is only prudent to keep 
in mind that the global economy still faces considerable risks and challenges . 
To assure a durable exit from the crisis, and to build in its wake a more sta-
ble international monetary system will require continued broad-based interna-
tional collaboration . In fact, fundamental shifts are under way already in global 
economic governance, involving new organizations, new methods, and a new 
sense of flexibility and innovation .
I will focus my remarks today on the role of Asia in this changing landscape, 
taking into account both the developments of the past year as well as the key 
challenges—and opportunities—that lie ahead .
The crisis response and underlying Fundamental changes
I am sure that you are all aware of the basic economic facts . Asia, despite its 
relatively strong initial condition entering the crisis, was hit hard late last year . 
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While it was not directly exposed to the financial assets that were at the epi-
center of this global crisis, Asia was severely affected by the sharp downturn in 
the United States and Europe as the trade implications of the global downturn 
reverberated through the Asian supply chain, capital flowed out of the region, 
and trade finance stalled . Measured from peak to trough, real GDP has fallen 
by nearly 4 percent in the United States, but it fell by more than 8 percent in 
Japan and by about 7 percent in emerging Asia (excluding China, India, and 
Indonesia) .
Fortunately, the global economy has begun to pull out of recession, and Asia 
looks set to emerge from the downturn both sooner and stronger than any other 
region . The IMF’s most recent World Economic Outlook forecasts global eco-
nomic contraction of about 1 percent this year and expansion of around 3 percent   
next year . At the same time, Asia is expected to grow by 2¾ percent this year 
and by 5¾ percent in 2010 . Strikingly, the three fastest growing economies in 
the G-20 are all from Asia—China, India, and Indo  nesia—with China projected 
to grow 8½ percent, India 5½ percent, and Indonesia 4 percent this year .
Aside from growth, Asia is doing well when measured by other economic 
indicators . For example, inflation has virtually disappeared, expected to end 
the year at a regional average of just under one-half of one percentage point . 
Also, employment losses in Asia have been much milder during this downturn 
than in past recessions .
Some have argued that Asia’s remarkable recovery reflects a decoupling 
from the rest of the world . However, the rebound so far reflects largely a return 
towards normalcy of trade and finance flows following their abrupt collapse at 
the end of 2008 . In fact, those economies with some of the largest initial con-
tractions were the so-called newly industrialized economies—Korea, Singa-
pore, and Hong Kong—with large shares of high-tech and other manufacturing 
trade with advanced economies . And, just as the U .S . downturn triggered an 
outsized fall in Asia’s GDP because international trade and finance froze, the 
normalization process is generating a rapid and strong Asian upturn .
The recovery also reflects quick and forceful policy actions in the region, 
including monetary easing, currency flexibility in many countries, and substan-
tial fiscal stimulus—in fact, larger than the G-20 average . Asian countries also 
have provided substantial financial sector support, including blanket deposit 
guarantees, backstopping the issuance of banks’ wholesale financing, and offer-
ing cover for corporations that had borrowed in foreign currency . The provision 
of cross-currency swaps, in some cases with the Federal Reserve, also helped 
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Finally, Asia’s recovery is a testament to its strong fundamentals, including 
the sound balance sheets of its private sector . When the crisis broke out, Asia’s 
banks and companies had solid capital positions, low leverage, and little expo-
sure to toxic assets . As a result, banks have been both willing and able to lend, 
which has meant that credit has not slumped by as much as in other regions .
The resilience of Asian economies in this crisis, their substantial contribu-
tions to global growth in recent years and the region’s importance in interna-
tional capital flows are underpinning the transformation of international fora . 
For example, a discussion of global economic cooperation would seem hollow if 
China—likely the world’s third largest economy—were absent . It should come 
as no surprise then that the G-20—with six representatives from the Asia- 
Pacific region—has been designated as the premier leadership forum for inter-
national economic cooperation among the largest economies .
Changes also are under way with regard to Asia’s role at the IMF, as the 
region is receiving a larger voice in accordance with its growing weight in the 
global economy . Under the reform of IMF quotas agreed to in April 2008, 
underrepresented Asian countries stand to gain nearly 3 percentage points in 
quota shares . Still, the region remains significantly underrepresented and, in 
the next review of quotas to be completed by January 2011, further gains are 
to be expected .
Asia’s rising influence in the global economy also is being mirrored in its 
financial assistance to the rest of the world . For example, the region has pledged 
to provide the IMF with US$178 billion in new lending resources—a third of the 
total pledged through the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) as well as the 
Note Purchase Agreement—to support countries combating balance of pay-
ments pressures brought on by the crisis .
This reshaping of economic governance is timely, and an integral part of the 
broader effort to reform the global economic and financial framework—and thus 
to lay the foundations for strong, balanced, and hence sustainable growth in the 
future . Global cooperation will be necessary if this effort is to be successful .
challenges and opportunities Beyond the crisis response
Turning now to some of the key challenges in the period ahead, as well as oppor-
tunities for building a stronger post-crisis world, the principal near-term risk 
is that the global recovery could stall . This could occur if private demand does 
not pick up and replace the policy stimulus and inventory restocking that have 
recently been the key drivers of growth . Policy support therefore should remain 
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Some Asian countries—particularly advanced and export-dependent econ-
omies that have experienced a relatively large cyclical weakening of their fis-
cal positions—are planning to withdraw fiscal stimulus over the course of 2010 
in response to the signs of recovery . However, these plans should proceed cau-
tiously until the recovery seems assured . At the same time, fiscal credibility 
could be enhanced by announcing concrete medium-term consolidation plans . 
Such plans will be particularly relevant for those countries starting from rela-
tively high debt levels (including Japan, India, and Malaysia) and those facing 
looming age-related fiscal pressures (such as Japan and the newly industrial-
ized economies of Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, and Taiwan Province of 
China) . But even for the average Asian country, without fiscal adjustment, debt-
to-GDP ratios are projected to remain above pre-crisis levels through 2014 .
For the bulk of the region, monetary conditions should remain supportive 
for longer than has been the case in previous cycles . Inflationary pressures gen-
erally remain muted, as the output gap has widened . With the recovery still 
tentative, inflation risks currently low, and limited asset price increases so 
far, a near-term tightening of monetary policy would be premature for most 
countries .
But there are a few exceptions where action may be appropriate sooner then 
elsewhere . In Australia, the recovery is advancing rapidly and output gaps are 
starting to close, prompting the Reserve Bank to become the first major coun-
try central bank to raise interest rates since the onset of the crisis . In India, 
core inflation and inflation expectations are rising as industrial production has 
recovered rapidly . And in China, growth is accelerating and the extraordinary 
pace of loan growth in the first half of 2009 raises the risk of future loan qual-
ity problems .
Over the longer horizon, there are significant risks of anemic global demand 
if the policy choices are not mutually supportive . Achieving sustained healthy 
growth for all countries will depend critically on rebalancing the pattern of 
global demand—not just from public-sector supported growth to private-sector 
supported growth but also from relative reliance on external demand to domes-
tic demand in surplus countries, and the reverse in deficit countries . Policy col-
laboration could help to insure that this process will take place in a mutually 
supportive fashion . In China as well as other emerging Asian countries that run 
large current account surpluses, the authorities have indicated their intention 
to emphasize policies that will support increased domestic demand, including 
via structural reforms . Increased exchange rate flexibility in some countries in 
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This rebalancing process will involve strengthening consumer confidence 
and facilitating a pickup in private investment in industries geared toward 
domestic markets . At the same time, improvements in corporate governance, 
financial intermediation, the quality of public investment, and social safety nets 
will help to continue improving productivity and support growth . In particu-
lar, research highlighted in the IMF’s October 2009 Asia and Pacific Regional 
Economic Outlook notes that improvements in corporate governance and con-
tinued financial sector reform have the potential to bring down the high levels 
of corporate savings in Asia and contribute to global rebalancing .
Global Governance
In Pittsburgh, the G-20 leaders stated clearly their commitment to policy col-
laboration in order to most effectively address the difficult challenges that 
lie ahead . Their “Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth” 
includes a cooperative, peer-review process—or mutual assessment—of their 
countries’ policy frameworks . And they have asked the IMF to assist in this 
process, by developing a forward-looking analysis of the overall consistency of 
individual countries’ policy frameworks with the overall goal of balanced and 
sustained global growth .
The IMF has considerable experience in analyzing members’ policy frame-
works and their implications for global economic and financial stability . This 
unique surveillance background has helped the Fund to provide timely and 
critical inputs to the international policy debate—for example, our call for an 
early and significant fiscal stimulus to cushion the crisis . The G-20 peer mutual 
assessment process should help to further enhance the traction and effective-
ness of multilateral surveillance .
The Fund is also engaged in other relevant initiatives . We have launched 
an Early Warning Exercise in cooperation with the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), focusing on systemic tail risks and the policy remedies that would be 
appropriate if such risks were to emerge . And we are improving other activ-
ities, such as the Financial Sector Assessment Program—that is conducted 
jointly with the World Bank—by sharpening the focus of assessments, mak-
ing them more flexible and nimble, and strengthening their analytical content . 
And we are actively participating in the regulatory reform work of the FSB . 
These adaptations and reforms should help facilitate a collaborative approach 
to shared economic problems .
The IMF also can contribute to a more stable international monetary sys-
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surveillance, adequate financial support, and effective technical assistance . 
Moreover, critical governance reforms—that have been given an important 
boost by the G-20—should help assure emerging market and developing coun-
tries that their views will be reflected fairly . These reforms include aligning 
the voice and representation of members with their weight in the global econ-
omy . As I mentioned earlier, underrepresented Asian countries will gain about 
3 percentage points in their Fund quota share as a result of the April 2008 
agreement . And they are expected to receive further gains in the new quota 
discussions that are scheduled to be completed by January 2011 .
One issue of importance that will involve directly many Asian economies 
is that of reserve accumulation and saving surplus . As you well know, many 
countries have rapidly built up official foreign exchange reserves over the past 
decade, in part as greater self insurance against balance of payments—pri-
marily capital account—shocks . Global economic efficiency would have been 
enhanced if the IMF had been able to provide the insurance demanded by these 
countries, but doubts about the amount of available financing and the conditions 
attached to this financing have encouraged self-insurance .
Such self insurance is costly both at the country level—given the foregone 
domestic absorption and the complications for monetary and exchange rate pol-
icy—and at the international level, where countries wishing to build up their 
reserves have tended to generate persistent current account surpluses . There 
is a real danger that in the wake of the current crisis there could be renewed 
widespread efforts to add to reserves . It is clear that if such efforts are pursued 
simultaneously, one result would be to dampen the global recovery .
As the key institution endorsed by the global community for meeting the 
financial needs of economies in crisis, the IMF has a responsibility to offer effec-
tive alternatives to self insurance . The IMF’s lending policies were recently 
overhauled to make them more responsive to the evolving needs of its member 
countries . Importantly, with the introduction of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), 
the IMF now offers a preemptive insurance facility for members with strong 
policies . Mexico, Poland, and Colombia have used this facility, and their decision 
to do so was well received by international markets . In Asian countries such as 
Mongolia and Sri Lanka, traditional IMF programs have played an important 
role in mitigating the impact of the crisis . Further work is under way on build-
ing on the success of our new facilities, for example, by enhancing predictability 
of access to crisis financing .
Of  course,  crisis  prevention  instruments  must  be  backed  by  sufficient 
resources in order to be credible, as recent experience has shown that finan-
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The tripling this year of the IMF’s lending resources to US$750 billion has 
allowed us to deploy financial resources in unprecedented amounts to support 
a broad array of countries and to help stabilize markets . To date, we have com-
mitted funds totaling more than twice the amount that were lent during the 
Asian crisis .
These resources, are temporary, however, requiring approval every five 
years, and they are contingent, activated only when a crisis is looming or under 
way . So, while these resources have proved sufficient so far in this crisis, they 
may not be enough to reassure markets and members—particularly those 
emerging Asian countries that are accumulating reserves from a self-insur-
ance motive—that this would necessarily be the case in future . As a result, the 
overall size of Fund quotas will be reviewed along with the shift in voting shares 
by January 2011 .
conclusion
In conclusion, the economy is recovering from a crisis, the fallout of which will 
be with us for years . But this recovery remains somewhat fragile, and there 
are many risks and challenges to a durable exit from the crisis . At the same 
time, fundamental changes are under way in global economic governance that 
bode well for the future . Policymakers have come together in these challenging 
times, and have strongly committed themselves to finding shared solutions to 
common problems .
The path out of the crisis will not be easy . But as long as we remain commit-
ted to create an effective multilateral process, we will be able to build a more 
stable and more productive international monetary and financial system that 
will benefit generations to come .
Thank you .